The Eelam war in Sri Lanka can be divided in to four sing different clip periods it erupted. Eelam war I was took topographic point during 23 July 1983 to 29 July 1987. India negotiated the peace trade. Mr JR Jayawardene was the president of Sri Lanka at that period.
Eelam war II took topographic point during 1990 – 1995 in Sri Lanka. Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa was the president of Sri Lanka ( 1989-1993 ) . This war prolonged up to two more old ages. Mr. Dingiri Banda Wijethunge ( 1993 – 1994 ) and Mrs. Chandrika Kumarathunga ( 1994 – 1995 ) were two presidents who had to confront this war.
Eelam war III erupted during the period of 1995 – 2002 in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately Tamil Lttes were able to win this war. Mrs Chandrika Kumarathunga ( 1994-2005 ) was the president of Sri Lanka. The strength of Sri Lankan forces was 200,000 while it was approximately 18,000 – 24,000 for the LTTE.Casualties and losingss for the Sri Lankan forces were 7838 while it was about 2876 for the LTTE.
Eelam war IV emerged during the period of 26th July 2006 – 18 Thursday May 2009 in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan Armed forces were able to win this war.With this triumph, Conventional military capablenesss of LTTE inside Sri Lanka has been ended. General Sarath Fonseka, the commanding officer of the Army was able to tag the terminal of Velupille Prabhakaran ; the leader of the LTTE. The strength of Sri Lanka forces was 250,000 ( about ) , while it was approximately 18,000 ( about ) for the LTTE. Sri Lankan Government claimed that about 6,261 killed and 29,551 were wounded. Sri Lankan Government besides claimed that approximately 15,000 to 22,000 of the LTTE were killed – during this war.
Human-centered mission of the present authorities marked the terminal of this drawn-out war. At present authorities is expeditiously seting frontward resettlement strategies for internally displaced individuals.
The casualties, deceases and other impacts occurred in past Eelam war are as follows:
Three Forces and Police – Deaths
Civilian – Deaths
IPKF – Deaths
Members of the LTTE-Deaths
Members of the LTTE-Captured
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Table 1.1 the casualties of the Eelam War in Sri Lanka
Estimated 40 % -50 % diminution in GDP.
Two tierces of cost incurred in North and East parts portion in GDP falls from 15 % to 4 % .
Misdemeanors of human and civil rights.
Gender based force and criminalisation of society.
Thousands handicapped and traumatized.
Thousands of former soldiers.
Addition in female headed families.
Democratic freedoms curtailed under exigency jurisprudence.
Weakening of administration and service bringing.
Economic trade stoppages in North and East.
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Table 1.2 other impact of the Eelam War in Sri Lanka
This survey finds the preliminary points about the past Eelam war in Sri Lanka. First, one utile manner to understand some major kineticss of the struggle is to look at the contentions and arguments that have emerged when efforts have been made to decide it before the human-centered mission. Second, failed and inconclusive efforts at deciding the struggle have non led to sustainable de-escalation but have alternatively reconstituted the struggle, redefining its parametric quantities and doing the possible waies to peace narrower. Peace dialogues have been occasions for the authorities of Sri Lanka and the Tamil extremes to detect new differences, explore new hostilities, and reenforce bing hostilities. Chiefly, there is a go oning spread between two communities in instruction, employment, issue of land and linguistic communication barriers, therefore minority feel bad on it.
The purpose of this Research is to place the grounds for the past Eelam war in Sri Lanka and to happen out a suited solution in order to run into future struggles.
Decrease of cantonment security
Inability to finish cantonment
Deploying military mans for cantonment glade
Sri Lankan authorities was able to stop the war utilizing really advanced war schemes. However, the grounds for the out interruption of war have non been decently addressed. The possibilities of reoccurrence of such a bloody war can non be rejected. In this survey attending has been paid to happen major ground for the eruption of the war.
Even though the LTTE has been destroyed militarily, the Tamil community who has one considered the LTTE as their freedom combatants and heroes. Therefore it is of extreme importance to happen major ground to set up a sustainable solution to the cultural job in order to show reoccurrence of a similar war.
Scope OF THE STUDY
To find whether favoritism to Tamils was the ground for the eruption of Eelam war in Sri Lanka and to acquire knowledge about impacts of the Eelam War in Sri Lanka. Other than that to hold knowledge about other grounds for the eruption of Eelam War, to find possible stairss to be taken to forestall re-occurrences of a similar war in Sri Lanka and to analyze the mistakes done in implementing solutions to do a peaceable Sri Lanka.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The chapter 1 gives a brief debut of the past Eelam war. The chapter 2 provides a brief history on the research methodological analysis which is the most of import portion in the survey, present state of affairs, and statement of the job and aims of the survey. Chapter 3explains root classs for the eruption of the Eelam war and efforts made towards a peaceable Sri Lanka even though they are failed in execution. The chapter 4 discusses about the consequences obtained through the study and the chapter 5gives decision and recommends future schemes to forestall any possibility of re-occurrence of similar war in the district of Sri Lanka.
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
For this survey primary and secondary informations were collected. Primary informations were collected utilizing a questionnaire and interviews. Secondary informations were collected through assorted signifiers of literature.
METHOD OF SAMPLING
Age, gender and race were considered prior to choose the sample for the survey in order to obtain acceptable replies to the questionnaire. After categorising individuals harmonizing to assorted age bounds, gender and race the sample was selected to include individuals indiscriminately. Sample size is 200 graded Random sampling was the method of trying.
AREA SELECTED FOR THE RESEARCH
Jaffna, Vauniya, Anuradhapura and Colombo territories have been selected to roll up primary informations. Jaffna and Vauniya have been selected to acquire Tamil people who had experienced the Eelam war. Anuradhapura was selected to acquire Sinhala people who had to confront many adversities for being occupants of an country really near to the North and Eastern states. Colombo has been selected as an country where many cultural groups live together.
Figure 2.1 Map of Sri Lanka
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Figure 2.2 Main territories of Sri Lanka
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
As the clip period is shorter it was really hard to roll up primary informations throughout the state. Merely 4 countries were selected for the survey. The sample size was besides really little comparing the population of the state. Therefore this sample may non stand for the sentiment of the whole state. In order to avoid such an mistake Random sample was selected to include assorted cultural groups, two genders and assorted age bounds countries were selected giving much accent to the people who really experienced the drawn-out Eelam war to cut down the mistake that could go on due to low coverage of the state as a whole.
Formation OF HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis is formed as “ Discrimination to the Tamil people in Sri Lanka was the ground for the eruption of Eelam war in Sri Lanka ” .
The term, “ favoritism ” means to handle one individual or group worse/better than another in an unjust manner. ( Oxford advanced scholar ‘s Dictionary of current English ) . The footings favoritism has been selected to bespeak favoritism to linguistic communication, instruction, employment and land usage of the Tamil People.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The inquiry Numberss 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are considered as the major inquiries for proving the hypothesis formed in this survey. The individuals with negative ( no ) replies for the inquiry No.1 are excluded from the survey as they were non in Sri Lanka during the period of Eelam War. The individuals with affirmatory ( “ yes ” ) replies to the inquiry No.10 are besides excluded from the analysis sing them as extremists to avoid incorrect determination devising that could be possible in the analysis.
GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS A RESOLUTION
ATTEMPTS MADE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SRI LANKA
From a historical position, internal political adjustment to settle the cultural job was initiated instantly after the Sinhala Only Act was tabled by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party ( SLFP ) authorities led by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike ( 1899-1959 ) in 1956, Several understandings or elect compacts were signed get downing with the treaty between SWRD Bandaranaike and Samuel James Velupillai Chelvanayagam ( 1898-1977 ) , leader of the Thamil Arasu Katchi ( Federal Party ) in 1957. The treaty, known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam treaty, had a treble docket, i.e. , degeneration of province power through regional councils, acknowledgment of Tamil as a national minority linguistic communication and decelerating down Sinhala relocation in the North and East. This invited a Sinhala patriot recoil, and rabble onslaughts on Tamils throughout the southern states were incited. In position of an anti-pact protest March by Buddhist monastics and outstanding members of the political resistance from the Sinhala Buddhist fastness of Kandy, Bandaranaike repudiated the treaty.
The following treaty was signed in 1965, between the so Prime Minister and leader of the United National Party ( UNP ) , Dudley Senanayake ( 1911-1973 ) and the leader of the Federal Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayagam. Senanayake was acute to procure the support of the latter in a new national authorities. The Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact agreed to implement a Tamil linguistic communication ( Particular Provisions ) Regulation, envisaged the constitution of territory councils, and decided on harmonizing penchant to the Tamils in relocation strategies in the North and E. Most commissariats in the treaty were non implemented, and four old ages subsequently, on 9 April 1969, the Tamil leading withdrew their support for the authorities. Failures of execution by the Sinhalese elite of these negotiated understandings contributed to a important hardening of the Tamil place on the cultural issue. The acceptance of an radical ideological place, on portion of a comparatively moderate TULF was foremost explicitly articulated in the celebrated Vaddukoddai Resolution ( 1976 ) . It enunciated the demand for a separate fatherland or Tamil Eelam, based on an unalienable right of self-government for the Tamils.
The 1970s and the early 1980s saw the gulf between the two communities widening farther. The Tamil leading began following an progressively hawkish position and aiming people opposed to their point of position. The widespread anti-Tamil public violences in 1977, the combustion of the library in Jaffna in 1981, and the public violences in July 1983 in response to the landmine onslaught on an ground forces convoy by the Tamil activists, which killed 17 soldiers, in a manner, signaled the adamant attitude of the two communities. The possibility of any internal adjustment was besides distant once the all party Conferences ( APC ) of 1984 failed to get at any solution to the crisis. The UNP-led Sri Lankan authorities could merely hold to the formation of territory councils in a devolved political construction. The resistance SLFP did non hold to the proposals. The TULF besides rejected them.
External engagement became imperative in these conditions. It is a fact that India had started easing the procedure of internal adjustment in the form of promoting the Tamils to take part in the APC. But one time the APC failed, India made the first effort to intercede a negotiated colony in August 1985 at Thimpu, Bhutan ; several factors prompted this proactive function. Sri Lanka ‘s strategic location, dictates of foreign policy precedences together with the sensitivenesss generated by the Sri Lankan cultural public violences in the southern province of Tamilnadu, defined the context for India ‘s mediation.
At Thimpu, the Sri Lankan Government deputation put frontward bill of exchange statute law for degeneration of powers. These proposals were merely marginally different from the one rejected by the APC of 1984, and the TULF. The Tamil deputation, intelligibly, was unwilling to negociate on proposals already rejected by the TULF. As a effect, Thimpu negotiations marked the first expressed articulation of the Tamil radical place. Consecrated in the joint statements issued by the Tamil deputation, including the LTTE every bit good as the TULF, were three central rules:
Reorganization of the Sri Lankan province ;
Recognition of the being of a Tamil fatherland consisting the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka ;
Recognition of the right of self-government of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
Since any solution based on the Thimpu rules would hold led to a vivisection of Sri Lanka, the negotiations were predestined to neglect. Besides, there was no concurrence of positions ; instead the authorities ‘s proposals and the Thimpu rules operated at two wholly different ideological and conceptual planes.
Following the prostration of the Thimpu Peace negotiations, a Draft Framework of Footings and Understanding was worked out by India. This was accepted by Colombo as the footing for future dialogues. Following the Draft Accord, the propinquity negotiations commenced. The two sides to the struggle were in contact with India as go-between but did non prosecute in direct face-to-face negotiations. This set the phase for the sign language of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in the summer of 1987. It brought the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force ( IPKF ) in the North and E of Sri Lanka to maintain peace between the armed Tamil groups and the Sri Lankan armed forces and oversee the execution of the Indo-Lanka agreement.
Political opposition in the South easy forced the authorities to vacate from its place. President Junious Jayawardene ( 1906-1996 ) who had signed the agreement was non excessively committed to it. In 1989, following the lifting cost in contending the Tigers and confronting resistance from Jayawardene ‘s replacement, President Ranasinghe Premadasa ( 1924-1993 ) , India decided to name off its forces from Sri Lanka. The IPKF withdrew in March 1990. This marked the failure of the 3rd serious effort at negociating peace. Focused wholly on the issue of backdown of the IPKF, and the disintegration of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front ( EPRLF ) led North Eastern Provincial Council ( NEPC ) , the Premadasa-LTTE Talks of 1989-90 had a political authorization and rather expectedly produced no colony result. The parties returned to war in 1990 after the IPKF pull out, reproducing a rhythm of failed peace efforts taking to war with greater strength.
In analysing the IPKF ‘s failure, it becomes evident that despite India ‘s attempts to broker peace, the 1987 Accord had certain loopholes, which undermined its saliency as a footing for a unequivocal colony of the cultural struggle. The LTTE and other Tamil organisations were non co-signatories to the peace agreement. The procedure itself relied to a great extent on “ propinquity negotiations ” and non direct dialogues between the parties to the struggle. Besides, the rule of neutrality, frequently emphasized as indispensable in the context of external mediation, ironically did non look to both the parties in struggle to be in India ‘s instance. India came to be viewed with intuition by both the LTTE and the Sinhala parties, and necessarily became embroiled as the 3rd party to the struggle.
The 4th effort at peace was made in 1994-95 in the context of a government alteration in Colombo. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga represented the broad face of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party ( SLFP ) , and she had won the elections on a peace platform. Kumaratunga instantly began dialogues with the LTTE. She put frontward a set of proposals for degeneration of powers to the part, which represented the boldest effort to right the instability in the relationship between the different cultural groups. Unfortunately, history repeated itself and both the proposals and constitutional reform enterprises submitted by her to the parliament were bitterly opposed by the resistance United National Party ( UNP ) Subsequent to four unit of ammunitions of negotiations, this peace enterprise excessively collapsed in April 1995, ensuing in a new stage of war. President Kumaratunga and the Sri Lankan armed forces felt that if they could get the better of the LTTE militarily, a lasting peace with the Tamil civil order, excepting the LTTE, could be negotiated and put in topographic point.
Map 2.3 LTTE controlled countries before Eelam war IV
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Map 2.4 States of Tamil Eelam
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THE PEACE PROCESS ( 2002-2006 ) : THE BEST OPPORTUNITY MISSED?
It took seven old ages of ague and concentrated war for the Sri Lankan province and the LTTE to subscribe another ceasefire understanding and get down a peace procedure. This 3rd ceasefire, facilitated by Norse mediators, proved to be the longest period of ‘no war ‘ or ‘negative peace ‘ that the island has witnessed so far. The Norse facilitation initiated by Chandrika Kumaratunga and the People ‘s Alliance authorities in 1998, paved the manner for a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding ( MoU ) signed officially on 22 February 2002. The MoU formalized a bilateral cease fire between the Government of Sri Lanka ( GoSL ) and the LTTE and attempted basically at furthering an ambiance of trust and assurance on both sides conducive to productive dialogues. It marked the beginning of the Track One stage of dialogues refering to treat issues and was regarded as the preliminary to the following stage ( Track Two ) , which would turn to ‘core issues ‘ of substance in deciding the struggle. The GoSL officially de-proscribed the LTTE, which was a pre-condition for engagement in peace negotiations. Six rounds of negotiations were held between September 2002 and April 2003 when the LTTE one-sidedly pulled out of the negotiations while reaffirming its committedness to continue the Cease-Fire-Agreement.
Out of these six unit of ammunitions, the 3rd unit of ammunition at Oslo in December 2002 marked a high point, and at that place a intimation of an evident convergence of negociating places. At Oslo, the LTTE made a substantial going from the Thimpu rules and expressed its willingness to research a solution founded on the rule of internal self-government, and based on a federal construction within a united Sri Lanka.
In April 2003, the preparatory givers ‘ seminar took topographic point in Washington. The LTTE, which was listed as a terrorist organisation by the US, could non be invited to the seminar. The Tigers argued that they could hold participated in the meet had it taken topographic point in another state. The LTTE felt that the Washington meet was a tactical rebuff and that the Sri Lankan authorities was seeking to derive political high land and non moving as a spouse, as it ab initio agreed to. In fact, it felt cloistered by an ‘international security trap ‘ and on 21 April, 2003 the LTTE, while take a firm standing that it would go on to honor the ceasefire, suddenly withdrew from peace negotiations scheduled to take topographic point in Thailand.
DATA PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS
THE COURSES OF TAMIL UNREST SINCE PRO INDEPENDENCE
In add-on to the barriers imposed by the continued usage of the English linguistic communication as the official linguistic communication after independency, the emerging nationalist forces perceived that Sri Lankan Tamils had entree to a disproportional portion of power as a effect of educational chances in the colonial period and were besides disproportionately represented in the civil disposal. Furthermore, considerable mercantile involvements were besides controlled by non – Sinhala groups. These frights and concerns were a footing for the political relations of linguistic communication that was to emerge.
Equally early as 1944, politicians proposed declarations in Parliament to declare Sinhalese the official linguistic communication, while other amendments proposed both Sinhalese and Tamil as linguistic communications. A 1944 declaration specified that Sinhalese and Tamil would go the linguistic communications of direction in schools, scrutinies for public services and legislative proceedings. The declaration was approved by 27 to 2 in the Sinhalese – dominated legislative. Committees were established to rede on how these alterations were to be implemented, nevertheless, there was small advancement in implementing the policy. In 1956, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike was elected Prime Minister with a chief election promise of set uping Sinhala as the official linguistic communication of the state, replacing English. The new authorities fulfilled this promise – through the transition of the so – called “ Sinhala Merely Bill ” ( Official Language act, No. 33 of 1956 ) -soon after the election giving no position of para to the Tamil linguistic communication.
The linguistic communication issue in many ways brought the Sinhalese – Tamil struggle into the head of Sri Lanka political relations. In footings of the dominant strands of Sinhala patriotism, the Sinhala linguistic communication along with the Buddhist faith needfully had to busy the pre – high place in society. This was perceived to be the lone manner the glorification of ancient Sinhala civilisation could be revitalized. Even though Tamil has been decreed an official linguistic communication along with Sinhalese in footings of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution ( in 1987 ) , the harm caused by the political relations of linguistic communication by and large remain unaddressed. Furthermore, the huge spread between the official acknowledgment of Tamil as an official linguistic communication and the practical execution of the commissariats and conditions it entails, is yet to be bridged.
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EDUCATION
Since the 1970s, entree to education – peculiarly entree to higher education-has been ethicized. In add-on, many other facets of education-including the structural organisation of schools and universities, contents of text editions and preparation of teachers-have impacted straight on cultural struggle. Compared to other cultural and spiritual groups in the state, Tamils have had strong cultural norms which valued instruction. Many Tamils attended English linguistic communication schools which were the passport to higher instruction and better employment in the colonial period. As a effect of good – funded American missional activities, the Tamil – dominated Northern Province had relatively better installations for English linguistic communication and pre – university instruction.
There was besides a bound beyond which Tamils could non be absorbed within the traditional land – based businesss in the waterless countries where they predominated. This farther encouraged many to seek employment through instruction. The net consequence was the relation over – representation of Tamils in higher instruction, professions and the disposal in comparing to their position in the general population.
In this context, station independency Sinhala patriotism sought to control the Tamil presence in instruction and therefore besides in the professions and civil disposal. While the passing of the “ Sinhalese Only Bill ” was one effort in this procedure, more direct hurdlings were placed on the way of Tamils ‘ realisation of educational ends since the 1970s. The constitutional commissariats in the 1972 Constitution prefering the Sinhala linguistic communication and Buddhist faith, along with their educational political relations, convinced many Tamils that they had been perceived as a fringy community.
From 1971 onwards, a new “ standardisation ” policy was adopted, which ensured that the figure of pupils measure uping for university entryway from each linguistic communication was proportionate to the figure of pupils who sat for university entryway scrutiny in that linguistic communication. In existent footings this meant that Tamil speech production pupils had to hit much higher than Sinhala talking pupils to derive admittance to universities. This besides meant that for the first clip, the unity of university admittances policy was tampered with by utilizing ethnicity as a footing. In 1972, a territory quota system was introduced in order to profit those non holding equal entree to educational installations within each linguistic communication. These alterations had a serious impact on the demographic forms of university entry.
In general, these policies earnestly impacted upon non merely the opportunities of Tamils to derive entree to higher instruction, but besides on the overall procedure of cultural dealingss as good. In 1977, the linguistic communication – based admittance policy was abolished and since that clip assorted accommodations have been introduced on the footing of virtue, territory quotas, disadvantaged country quotas, etc. While the obvious ethno – lingual favoritism of the 1971 policy has long been dismantled, many Tamil young person still experience that they are discriminated against in entree to higher instruction.
Related to the organisational construction of educational establishments, it is clear that linguistic communication – based segregation takes topographic point. This does non use to in private – owned establishments in which instructions is in English, but applies to establishments with more than one linguistic communication of instructions ( such as some universities, assorted media schools and proficient institutes ) where system of internal segregation takes topographic point. In existent footings Sinhala pupil are segregated into Sinhala – linguistic communication schools and Tamil and Tamil-speaking Muslim pupils are segregated into Tamil-language schools. If they enter universities or proficient institutes, this segregation is likely to go on unless they opt to, and have the money to have, a non-segregated farther instruction in English in private establishments.
Since the early – 1980s, many have stressed the function school text drama in determining cultural dealingss in the state. Ideally, school texts ( e.g. , texts used for learning faith, linguistic communication, societal surveies, etc. ) should portray the multi – cultural world of Sri Lankan society and reference issues that are of import in this context while nearing the prescribed capable affair. School texts have been written, supervised, produced and distributed by bureaus of the province, intending that their contents reflect province policy or thought. Furthermore, cultural political relations have besides been played out in the procedure of text production. In recent times some of the more debatable contents in these texts have been removed in the procedure of alteration and re – authorship. Ironically nevertheless, sometimes this has gone to the opposite utmost – e.g. , in some texts all mentions to ethnicity and related issues have been removed.
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EMPLOYMENT
As mentioned above, both linguistic communication and instruction policies have placed barriers on employment, particularly in the administrative and professional ranks in which Tamils were at one point “ over – represented. ” In the private sector which for the most portion continued to work in English-employment chances for Tamils and other minorities remained comparatively unfastened. As a consequence, today some of the taking concern ventures in the state are Tamil-owned. However, as a consequence of the favoritism that has occurred in province sector employment patterns over clip, there is a inclination among many Tamils to comprehend of themselves as by and large discriminated against in employment. Harmonizing to the nose count of public sector and corporate sector employment in 1990, Sri Lankan Tamils accounted for 5.9 % of those employed in the province services. This represents a important bead from earlier old ages.
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ISSUE OF LAND
The issue of ownership over and entree to land has besides been a consistent country in which cultural political relations in Sri Lanka have manifested, and have sustained themselves over the old ages. As celebrated, one of the distinctive features in the demographic forms in Sri Lanka is the comparative concentration of certain cultural groups in certain geographical parts. The clearest site of land and ethnicity has been in the sparsely populated countries of the dry zone in the North Central Province and the Eastern Province. When station independency authoritiess decided to settle hapless Sinhala husbandmans from the dumbly populated moisture zone countries of the state, many Sinhala politicians and people in general viewed the procedure as a “ renewal and diversion in the nowadays of the glorious Sinhala Buddhist yesteryear. ” The alleged “ colonisation strategies ” became an built-in facet of Sinhala Buddhist ‘nation-building. ‘
Not surprisingly, the Tamils had a wholly different perceptual experience of the colonisation of the dry zone. The impression of the ‘traditional Tamil fatherland ‘ became a powerful constituent of popular Tamil political imaginativeness. Since Sinhala irrigation colonies in the North Central and Eastern Provinces occurred under direct province sponsorship, it appeared for many Tamils as a deliberate effort of the Sinhalese-dominated province to marginalise them farther by diminishing their figure in the country. The colonisation schemes did change the demographic forms, peculiarly in the Eastern Province in a important manner.
A determination was made in the late-1970s to speed up the development of the dry zone through the “ Accelerated Mahaweli Program, ” that provided for the gap up of dry zone countries further for agribusiness and relocation of people. Merely in 1986, as a consequence of go oning Tamil agitations, did the authorities agree to apportion the staying and under the Mahaweli Program on the footing of the cultural distribution of each cultural group in the entire population.
Tabulation OF RESULTS OBTAINED BY THE QUESTIONNAIRE
( no of sample= 200 people Sinhala/Tamil )
Answers to inquiries
Table 4.1 Consequences of the Questionnaire
If the per centum of affirmatory replies ( “ Yes ” ) for inquiry No 4, 5, 7 and 8 is higher than 50 % and “ negative ” reply ( “ No ” ) for inquiry figure 6 is higher than 50 % Hypothesis tested can be considered as true. For that intent it is of import to cipher the per centums of the above replies.
“ Yes ”
( % )
“ No ”
( % )
Table 4.2 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers
Chart 4.1 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q4 )
Chart 5.2 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q5 )
Chart 4.2 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q5 )
Chart 4.3 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q6 )
Chart 5.4 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q7 )
Chart 4.4 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q7 )
Chart 4.5 Percentage of “ Affirmative ” ( Yes ) and negative ( No ) Answers ( No ) Answers ( Q8 )
When following conditions are positive, hypothesis will be true ;
If per centum of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 4 is more than 50 % .
If per centum of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 5 is more than 50 % .
If per centum of negative replies to oppugn figure 6 is more than 50 % .
If per centum of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 7 is more than 50 % .
If per centum of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 8 is more than 50 % .
Percentage of affirmatory and negative replies as follows ;
Percentage of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 4 & gt ; 50 % .
Percentage of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 5 & gt ; 50 % .
Percentage of negative replies to oppugn figure 6 & gt ; 50 % .
Percentage of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 7 & gt ; 50 % .
Percentage of affirmatory replies to oppugn figure 8 & gt ; 50 % .
After sing all the historical facts and informations it can be identified hypothesis has been proved to be true.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sri Lanka was experienced to contend 30 old ages prolonged internal struggle with the LTTE. Ultimately the authorities was able to implement peace after get the better ofing the terrorists as a consequence of a strategically conflict. Although the terrorist act is in its acrimonious terminal, classs for the Tamil unrest remain same in the state. Harmonizing to the consequences of the survey ; Discrimination to the Tamil people was the ground for the eruption of the Eelam war in Sri Lanka.
It is of import to advert that conventional military capablenesss of the LTTE organisation inside Sri Lanka have been ended. Therefore a sustainable solution can be obtained without the intercession of the LTTE.
The Tamil people of Sri Lanka ever live with the thought that Sinhala, Buddhist people are more privileged than the Tamil. With this vision they ever think they are a minor cultural group holding less privilege. At this occasion it is really of import to alter this negative attitude of those people.
On the other manus, the Sinhalese have to alter their mentality which tends to see Tamil people as a minor cultural group populating under their leading. The Sinhala people have to alter their heads to accept the Tamil state as a respectable cultural group populating together in Sri Lanka.
For this intent, larning of two linguistic communications by each cultural group should do compulsory. This can be achieved by presenting Sinhala and Tamil languages as compulsory for acquiring through the G.C.E. ( O/L ) Examination and as a making for sit for the G.C.E. ( A/L ) Examination.
Sinhala and Tamil Students should be admitted to all national schools to do each cultural group understand each other better. Sinhala and Tamil pupils at schools should promote the engagement of both groups in order to place and larn cultural heritage, historical relationships and linguistic communication of each cultural group.
In the field of civil orders, the Tamil people think that they do non hold adequate leaders to stand for them. Therefore it is just to include a fixed figure of Tamil Ministers in the Cabinet. This will add some value to the whole set of the Tamil people.
At the minute, registration of pupils to the National Universities is done to stand for cultural ratio of the state. This can besides be implemented in the enlisting of individuals to the populace sector. This will be a good solution to one ailment of the Tamil people that they can non pass on in their ain linguistic communication at public Institutions.
It is of import to set up definite standards to inscribe Tamil individuals to three forces and constabularies. It will do disposal easier. Besides it will eliminate the negative sentiment of Tamil people towards the three forces and constabularies. At the same clip, the negative mentality of three forces and constabularies towards the three forces and constabularies. At the same clip, the negative mentality of three forces and constabularies towards Tamil nationality can besides be changed.
Today proficiency in the Sinhala and Tamil linguistic communications is considered as the major standards in enrolling public officers. Likewise it is of import to give bring oning inducements to authorities officers to hold proficiency in both linguistic communications. Language instruction, carry oning efficient and effectual classs, supplying cautionary inducements and supplying class fees to analyze linguistic communications is some methods to increase the engagement of authorities officers in larning both the linguistic communications.
Most of Tamils are willing to hold a lasting solution. This may be a federal system as in India. However the ageless solution is decidedly inside the Black Marias of all Sri Lankan. Any solution should be agreed upon by all Sri Lankan.