Military revolution and revolution of military affair The world is continuing to experience changes that are affecting every generation of people in society without regard to race, religion, age, sex, political status or geographical location. These changes are certainly important chapters for our history books. For the most part I would say these changes are like evolution which has led to the diversification of all living organisms from a common ancestor, known as a scientific development discovered by the scientist Charles Darwin.
Comparatively changes that occur in society affecting organizations, people, politics and policies and technology results in diversification in ways of life over time as result of what we call a revolution. For example when we look at Military Revolution and Revolution of Military Affair (RMA), they are largely complementary to each other. Although, Military Revolution mainly addresses political and social issues, while RMA, focuses on technology for conventional combined-arms warfare and strategic givens and not social and political issues.
Hence, this paper main focus is to expose and define the characteristics that differentiate these two revolutions. First it is important to know that the concept of military revolution was introduced in the 1950’s during the inauguration speech “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” over fifty years ago by the famous military historian, Michael Robert. He suggested that the art of war in early modern Europe was radically transformed over the space of a century.
He also noted that a tactical revolution based on the use of linear formations of drilled musketeers led to a massive increase in the size of armies, which in turn had dramatically heightened the impact of war on society it self. Thus Military Revolution can be summarized as a radical change in military strategy and tactics with resulting major changes in government (Military Revolution). On the other hand RMA, focuses on the future of warfare and is more often than not connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change specific to the United States military and other Armies.
It is especially associated with modern information, communication and space technology, and often linked to current discussions under the label of Transformation and total systems integration in the US military. Thus it is safe to say that establishment of the modern effective nation states is based on organized military power of the 17 century. For example, the establishment of the Jordan law of 1798 as a new system of universal conscription requiring all men to register is another example of military revolution.
From this registration the government at the time set a quota of conscript to draw form those eligible for the draft. This conscript not only provides Soldier for Napoleon army but it serves as a law throughout the western and central Europe (Parker, 198). As one continue to examine the theory of RMA it becomes clear that it function to express strategies. According to the author, it is only by understanding the nature and working of strategies that a grip can be secured upon the promise in an RMA.
The theory of RMA has proven to be detrimental to the affairs of military strategies with the development of the nuclear bomb by the Soviet Union in 1945 (Collins, 202). The nuclear RMA was a sudden burst upon a world already habituated to the pursuit of absolute ends by military means as absolute as contemporary expertise allowed. Military revolution and RMA are like, science and politics; they met and fed on each other in the weaponisation of nuclear physics (202). Hence, the nuclear RMA was an expression to the answer to the recognition of a political military challenge that logically followed the promise of science.
Revolutions in warfare have resulted not from technology alone, but rather from infrequent social and political upheavals (what they term “military revolutions”) or from the battlefield exploitation of new technologies through innovative operational concepts and organizational change (what they call “RMAs”) (Knox ,3). In other words the author is saying political debates, strategies and polices are develop from the outcome of military revolution which is instrumental in bring about the technological development in weaponry that are developed as a result of RMA.
Although it is widely recognized that technological changes are the revolutionizing force for warfare in the 21st century the issues that are addressed in Military Revolution are synergic to those of RMA. The”Anatomy of a Failed Occupation of 1871” is a prime example of why these two revolutions cannot operate effectively separately despite there are significant differences. This was a time of great uprising in southern United States when local terrorist was able to undermine the state government to reestablish their own political dominance.
The government failed miserable; due to poor planning inappropriate and infective resources, such as advance technology. In addition the Army lack will power needed to establish and enforced the political policies and strategies of the government. Reviewing of several literatures reveals the great promises revolution in military affairs holds for conventional, combined-arms warfare, but the same cannot be said of its potential value in conflict short of war. When, it comes to terrorism, insurgency, or violence associated with drug trafficking, it is not so clear-cut.
The outcome can be a failure as it was during the reconstruction period in the Southern United State. These are situations that differentiate the two revolutions hence, national leaders and strategists has an obligation to proceed cautiously and only after a full exploration of the ethical, political, and social implications of their decisions before starting a revolution. Napoleon realized the implication of launching into a revolution and took great caution before making decisions. He knew it was critical that he win the, Battle of Austerlitz, before making a final decision he consulted one of his officers “Soult! Napoleon barked, “How long will it take your men to reach the summit? ” “Twenty minutes,” he responded, but since Napoleon wanted to have his enemy deeper in the trap, he had Soult waited another 20 minutes. Within an hour Napoleon received message of the conquest of Pratzen. Military Revolution and RMA are about changes military revolution mainly addresses political and social issues, while RMA focuses on technology for conventional combined-arms warfare and strategic givens and not social and political issues.
One could argue that these are two very different phenomena which have been at work over the past centuries: “military revolutions,” which are driven by vast social and political transformation, and “revolutions in military affairs,” that is deeply rooted and limited by strategic givens, and the nature of war that is directed by military institutions, with great difficulty and ambiguous results. Hence one without the other is a setup for failure. .Bibliography Gray, Collins. STRATEGY, COMPLEX AND SOMETIMES NONLINEAR: Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History Southgate, London; Crown House, 2005.
Kak, Kapil, Dy. Revolution in Military Affairs—An Appraisal http://www. idsa-india. org/an-apr-01. html accessed on (June 3, 2011). Knox, MacGregor. ” Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare”. Edited by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050. New York: Cambridge University Press Military Revolution June 13, 2011. http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Military_Revolution Wikipedia accessed June 28, 2011. Parker, Geoffery. The Cambridge Illustrated: history of warfare, Edited by Geoffrey Parker, 198. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Rizwan, Sharjeel. http://www. defencejournal. om/2000/sept/military. htm accessed July 15, ———————–  Louis A. DiMarco Anatomy of a Failed Occupation: The U. S. Army in the Former Confederate States,1865 to 1877 ((Arlington, Va. : Association of the United States Army, November 2007), excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H108 Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 1992), 3  Leslie Anders, “Armies of the People and the Birth of Modern Operational Art,” Austerlitz A Clash of Command Systems. Army Command and General Staff College, H107 Book of Readings,1-8. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, July 2011.