The authoritiess in the Britain and Sri Lanka despite being about 10,000km apart, faced really similar menaces in the signifier of the Irish Republican Army ( IRA ) in Northern Ireland from 1969 till the Belfast Agreement in 1998, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ( LTTE ) in the Northern and Eastern states of Sri Lanka from 1976 boulder clay Velupillai Prabhakaran ‘s death in mid 2009. Both the IRA and LTTE were ethno-nationalist terrorist administrations, seeking to wrestle control from the incumbent authorities through extreme and frequently violent agencies in order to set up a specific signifier of ego administration which they desired[ 1 ]. Operationally, both administrations relied to a great extent on abroad support every bit good as utilise political foreparts like the Sinn Fein and the LTTE political wing to garner international support[ 2 ]. Statistically, although the struggle in Sri Lanka resulted in much higher Numberss in footings of existent individuals killed, both struggles had surprisingly comparable ratio in footings of human deaths to entire population[ 3 ].
Bearing in head such analogues, the terminal consequences could non hold been more different with the British holding an amicable colony with the IRA, and the Sri Lankan utilizing military force to pass over out the LTTE. This paper attempts to reexamine the ground for the opposing terminations by comparing and contrasting the counter-terrorism schemes adopted by the two authoritiess in three groupings, viz. : ( I ) similar in nature ; ( two ) similar yet different ; and ( three ) divergent in nature.
Comparison & A ; COntraST
Among the many counter-terrorism schemes adopted by the British and the Sri Lankan authorities against the IRA and the LTTE, ( I ) the usage of exigency statute laws ; and ( two ) buttonholing international community against the terrorist groups are two policies used which the two authorities ‘s attack had been really similar.
Use of Emergency Legislations
Both states had been comparatively prompt in doing legislative alterations to cover with the insurrectionists, and similarities extend to holding the same name for the exigency act used. One logical ground for this is likely due to the fact that Sri Lanka was a British settlement and had ‘inherited ‘ its legislative construction and system[ 4 ]. Operationally, the exigency Torahs besides allowed enforcement bureaus to prosecute and map in a mode usually non allowed under civil jurisprudence.
In the instance of Northern Ireland, the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident which killed 13 civilians had resulted in the British suspending the Stormont Parliament, and puting Northern Ireland under direct regulation[ 5 ]. In add-on, the Emergency Provisions Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act were introduced in order to let the enforcement bureaus to obtain confessions during extended periods of detainment without condemnable charge of entree to advocate[ 6 ].
Similarly in Sri Lanka, the first Eelam war from the mid 1970s to 1989 which targeted Tamil moderate politicians and constabulary betrayers provided the drift for the Public Security Ordinance Act of 1947 to be given constitutional position in 1978, leting the Sri Lankan authorities to ordain exigency ordinances in the involvement in public safety[ 7 ]. Like the British authorities, the Sri Lankan authorities passed its ain version of the Prevention of Terrorism ( Temporary ) Act in 1978 which allowed enforcement of exigency regulations in the affected states[ 8 ].
Lobbying of international community
Another similar attack taken by both authoritiess is in the active lobbying the international community in blacklisting the IRA and LTTE as terrorist administrations, and in restricting the activities of the IRA and LTTE overseas, peculiarly, in the country of terrorist funding. One possible principle is merely due to the fact that abroad fund raising operations were lending up to 50-60 % of the two administrations ‘ operational support[ 9 ]–[ 10 ].
In the instance of the IRA, the British authorities had after heavy diplomatic force per unit area, managed to convert the US to take action against the Irish Northern Aid Committee ( Noraid ) , founded in 1969 by Irish civil war veterans[ 11 ]. Similarly, with respects to the LTTE, the Sri Lankan authorities ‘s attempts managed to convert taking states such as the US, UK, Canada and EU among others in the late ninetiess in naming the LTTE as a terrorist administration[ 12 ]. This led to a series of world-wide apprehensions of cardinal LTTE abroad secret agents and the shutting of several front administrations, to a great extent affected LTTE ‘s abroad fund elevation and arms procurance programmes[ 13 ].
Similar yet Different Schemes
With respects to similar yet different schemes adopted by the two authoritiess, two peculiar 1s highlighted in this paper are: ( I ) the usage of the military and ( two ) dialogues for peace.
Use of the military
The usage of the military early in the run was a common scheme used by both states. The difference is in the magnitude of ‘force ‘ used as the several run progressed, with the British apparently going more restraint while Sri Lanka ‘s attack going more militarized. A plausible account is due to the British Army holding a minimal force civilization[ 14 ].
The British authorities had originally intended to deploy its ground forces merely for a ‘weekend mission ‘ in Belfast and Londonderry on 12 August 1969. ‘Operation Banner ‘ as it was codenamed would finally turn out to be a drawn-out mission that lasted over 37 old ages[ 15 ]. While there was initial physique up of ground forces forces in Northern Ireland, it peaked around the Bloody Sunday incident, and as the run against the IRA progressed, British soldiers stationed in Northern Ireland would, from the 27,000 in 1972 decreased as the dialogues for peace began in the 1980s, to less than half by the clip the Good Friday understanding was signed[ 16 ].
In comparing, the Sir Lankan authorities had similarly used military schemes to oppress the LTTE since its origin in early 1970 ‘s in northern parts of the state[ 17 ]. However, the magnitude of military resources poured into the counter-terrorism attempts grew exponentially as the run progressed, in peculiarly after the 1980s[ 18 ]. Numerically, since the LTTE run started, the Sri Lankan ground forces had grown exponentially from a mere 12,000 work forces in 1963 to the 4th largest ground forces in the universe of 150,000 strong in 1999[ 19 ].
While both states had legion efforts in negociating with the terrorist groups for long term peace colonies, the British have had well more success, which led to the sign language of the Belfast Agreement. One account is due to both the British authorities and the IRA holding the political will to see the through the peace understanding with the realization that both parties can non win the struggle[ 20 ]. Another imaginable ground why dialogues between the Sri Lankan authorities and the LTTE did non produced any long term constructive advancement is the deficiency of a suited 3rd party intermediary[ 21 ].
For the British authorities, it had, after the Bloody Sunday incident tried to negociate for colony with the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. Although the Sunningdale Agreement was non successful, it did, as a first measure manage to convert the IRA protagonists that the British authorities was willing to do peace[ 22 ]. While there was intermittent advancement between 1977 and 1993 due to alterations in British policy, the alteration back to an adjustment scheme from 1993 onwards allowed contributing dialogues between the British authorities and the IRA[ 23 ].
The Sri Lankan authorities had every bit held legion unit of ammunitions of dialogues with the LTTE in the 1980s through to the early 2000s with some being initiated by a 3rd party such as India and Norway and others merely between the two affected parties[ 24 ]. However, due to a deficiency of committedness and earnestness by both parties in suiting to each other demands, advancement had been distressingly slow and hard[ 25 ]. There is besides a common belief that the peace dialogues simply acts as an chance for the LTTE to construct up its arms and fundss[ 26 ]. Hence, while there had been assorted negotiated seize fire understandings, all have ended in failures as evident in the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord which increase the degree of struggle alternatively of diminishing it[ 27 ].
In footings of divergent schemes, one most conspicuous and highlighted in this paper is in which the mode of which the two authoritiess choose to stop the struggles.
The two struggles could non hold ended much more otherwise with the British authorities taking the attack of peaceable dialogues and the Sri Lankan authorities utilizing military force to infest the LTTE. This opposing attack can be attributed to the broad misgiving between the Sri Lankan authorities and the LTTE accumulated over old ages of struggle[ 28 ]. The historical background of the two states is besides postulated to be a conducive factor[ 29 ].
In the instance of Northern Ireland, it may be deserving sing the historical context which created the IRA job can be argued to be one made in good religion in seeking to protect the Protestant bulk, when the British authorities retained the 6 counties in Northern Ireland in 1921[ 30 ]. Hence, it was non the purpose of the British authorities to spread out its influence and keep onto Northern Ireland.
On the other manus in Sri Lanka, the struggle is between two cultural groups ; the Sinhala bulk and the Tamil minorities, is one of deep set common hatred developed old ages before the formation of the LTTE[ 31 ]. This, coupled with the fact that the end of the LTTE will efficaciously dissect land which is presently under the bulk Sinhalese Sri Lankan authorities makes it hard for Sri Lanka to follow a peaceable declaration.
In comparing the assorted schemes used by the two authoritiess, while there are similar attacks taken, they appear to be adopted merely when it is convenient, i.e. heritage of statute law or a common operational demand to make so, i.e. lobbying of international support. The differences in attacks adopted by the several authoritiess, in peculiar, in how the struggle is ended, look to be really much linked to the historical context of which how the struggles came approximately, with the British choosing to stop in peace and Sri Lankan in war.